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The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) poses serious threats to human life, the environment, infrastructure and, more broadly, to international peace and security. Both state and non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, pose proliferation threats. Countering the flow of funds to proliferation actors plays a vital role in combating the proliferation of WMDs.
There is no international definition of ‘proliferation financing’. International obligations to combat the financing of proliferation are primarily contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 which calls on states to use criminal, civil or administrative measures to combat the proliferation of WMDs by non-state actors, and UNSCRs imposing sanctions on Iran and North Korea as state proliferation actors. Together, these UNSCRs contain a broad range of what may be described as financial measures to combat proliferation of WMDs. Proliferation financing can therefore be described as both a financial crime risk and a sanctions risk.[1]
Targeted financial sanctions are one component of a range of UNSCR measures to counter the flow of funds to proliferation actors. The Financial Action Task Force[2] (FATF) sets standards for implementing targeted financial sanctions against Iran and North Korea to combat their nuclear proliferation programs. FATF Recommendation 7 and Immediate Outcome 11 outline international standards for effectively implementing targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation.
The FATF also produced a working definition of proliferation financing based on UNSCR 1540 as follows:
"Proliferation financing" refers to: the act of providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, export, trans-shipment, brokering, transport, transfer, stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and related materials (including both technologies and dual use goods used for non-legitimate purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations.[3]
To find information on the full range of sanctions measures, particularly against North Korea, you should consult the United Nations Sanctions website at:
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information
The full range of UN sanctions measures go beyond targeted financial sanctions to also include activity-based financial prohibitions, economic or sectoral sanctions and related financial prohibitions, and vigilance measures.
Two other useful resources are listed below, both of which contain quick reference lists and descriptions of the full range of UNSCR sanctions obligations.
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20181002_model_law_2nd_edition_final_for_web.pdf
Money laundering is a circular process, whereby criminally generated funds are laundered to make them available again for use in licit form. While proliferation financiers may use money laundering techniques to move funds through the financial system, the process of proliferation financing is linear. In this way, it is similar to terrorism financing. Proliferation financiers move funds through stages and use them to pay for goods and services required for proliferation of WMDs.[4]
A report by CNAS described the three stages of proliferation financing as:
Source: Dr Jonathan Brewer, The Financing of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, CNAS, January 2018, p.5.
A report by RUSI further broke proliferation financing into three categories of activities:[6]
This includes funds and payments to procure proliferation-sensitive goods and financial services supporting the trade in proliferation-sensitive goods (import/export of goods as well as transport of goods). For example, trade finance products, maritime or cargo insurance and export guarantees.
This includes illicit activities, such as:
It can also include licit profit-making activities where the proceeds are diverted to support proliferation of WMDs. For example:
This category reflects the complex networks that are developed by proliferation actors, particularly North Korea, to facilitate its activities in the above two categories. This category of activities includes the establishment of joint ventures or front companies, the provision of remittances services (for example by companies not licensed as remitters), and cross-border transportation mules. Proliferation financing may not be the sole or predominant purpose of the corporate activities and products may also be unwittingly used.
For further typologies or case studies of proliferation financing, you should consult the resources below.
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports
https://projectalpha.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2018/05/FoP-13-October-2017-Final.pdf
A country may be exposed to proliferation financing risks in different ways, including:
The financial sector’s exposure to proliferation financing risks should be explored by considering the above factors through a further analysis of:
For further information on conducting risk assessments, you should consult the resources below. The FATF Guidance provides general information for developing risk assessment methodologies. The RUSI Guide provides information and tools for proliferation financing-specific risk assessment methodologies. It is primarily aimed at governments, but also includes a sectoral risk assessment tool that would be useful for the financial sector. The CNAS paper is primarily aimed at financial institutions.
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/National_ML_TF_Risk_Assessment.pdf
Guidance on enhancing compliance with targeted financial sanctions, including those related to proliferation financing, can be found on the FIU website: www.mongolbank.mn/TFS-Guidance
For a more comprehensive approach to mitigating proliferation financing risks more broadly, counter-proliferation financing considerations should be included in:
You should consult all available open-sources regularly (e.g. UN Panel of Experts Reports).
You should engage with authorities regularly: Financial Information Unit (e-mail: fiu@mongolbank.mn), General Intelligence Agency (e-mail: amltf@gia.gov.mn)
Understand your geographic and activity exposure to proliferation financing risks
Know Your Customer
Identify proliferation financing sensitive goods and activities
United Nations Security Council Resolution on non-proliferation
Resolution 1540 (2004) of the Security Council, adopted on 28 April 2004
Successor resolutions to the above Resolution
United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Resolution 1718 (2006) of the Security Council, adopted on 14 October 2006
Resolution 1874 (2009) of the Security Council, adopted on 12 June 2009
Resolution 2087 (2013) of the Security Council, adopted on 22 January 2013
Resolution 2094 (2013) of the Security Council, adopted on 7 March 2013
Resolution 2270 (2016) of the Security Council, adopted on 2 March 2016
Resolution 2321 (2016) of the Security Council, adopted on 30 November 2016
Resolution 2371 (2017) of the Security Council, adopted on 5 August 2017
Resolution 2375 (2017) of the Security Council, adopted on 11 September 2017
Resolution 2397 (2017) of the Security Council, adopted on 22 December 2017
Successor resolutions to the above Resolutions
United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Iran
[1]Joshi, Dall, Dolzikova, Guide to Conducting a National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment, RUSI Occasional Papers, May 2019, p.5.
[2]The Financial Action Task Force is an inter-governmental body that sets standards on anti-money laundering, counter- terrorism financing and counter-proliferation financing.
[3]FATF, Combating Proliferation Financing: A Status Report on Policy Development and Consultation, 2010.
[4]Dr Jonathan Brewer, The Financing of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, CNAS, January 2018, pp.4-5.
[5] Dr Jonathan Brewer, The Financing of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation, CNAS, January 2018, p.4.
[6]Joshi, Dall, Dolzikova, Guide to Conducting a National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment, RUSI Occasional Papers, May 2019.
[7]These are the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Group.
[8]Berger, Joshi, Countering Proliferation Finance: Implementation Guide and Model Law for Governments, RUSI Guidance Paper, July 2017, pp.9-10.
[9]Joshi, Dall, Dolzikova, Guide to Conducting a National Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment, RUSI Occasional Papers, May 2019, Annex 6 RUSI Proliferation Financing Rapid Risk Assessment Tool.
[10]FATF, Proliferation Financing Report, June 2008, Annex 1. Report is available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Typologies%20Report%20on%20Proliferation%20Financing.pdf